

Clark Paper

Hans Belting:

Toward an Anthropology of the Image

On the cover of my book “Bild-Anthropologie” originally was to appear a photograph that Robert Frank shot in 1977. It was a picture which he eventually included in the second edition of his unusual autobiography entitled “The lines of my hand” where it appeared among other pictures from his oeuvre which he rearranged and republished on that occasion¹. The same photograph there introduces a new phase of his life which began when he moved to Nova Scotia (fig. 1). The landscape represents the view from his new domicile, but the foreground is closed by an old photograph from his series “The Americans”. On the same level, there appears a negative print of a paper sheet with the writing “words”, a plural in a singular: words which in the autobiography are replaced by pictures². Word and image are part of a very personal mise-en-scène of his own past. The same arrangement also serves the question: What then is an image? Or: Where is the image? Is it in our gaze or only in his memory and to what extent is it on the print? Robert Frank questioned the identity of photo print and image which we so easily and thoughtlessly take for granted. He thus emphasized a distinction between a visual medium, in his case photography, and an image which is not tantamount to its artistic support and also transcends the identification as mere subject matter. My own book incidentally had been already printed when Robert Frank unexpectedly withdrew his permission to reproduce the cover picture. Thus the same book has been republished with an entirely new cover.

The question “What is an image?” needs an anthropological approach since an image, as we will see, ultimately amounts to an anthropological definition. Art History usually answers other questions, as it studies the work of art (be it a picture, a sculpture, or a print), an object tangible and historical which allows for classification, dating and exhibition. An image, on the other hand, defies such attempts of reification, even to the degree that it often fluctuates between physical and mental existence. It may live in a

work of art but does not coincide with it. The English distinction between image and picture is pertinent in my case, but only in the sense that it allows us to sharpen the quest for the image in the picture. On a more general level, the question relates to the image in a given medium, be it photography, painting or video. But it only makes sense when there are we who ask it, because we live in bodies in which we generate images of our own and therefore can also play them out against images in the visible world.

It will by now have become evident that I do not use the term anthropology in the sense of ethnology, but that I follow a European definition for which I owe you some explanations. Likewise I do not exclusively speak of *art* which would require a somewhat different discourse, but of *images*. I insist on this distinction in order to avoid wrong expectations. As an art historian, I deal with Western art, where the famous old debate on *art and ethnology* does not apply. It is the debate whether ethnographic art needed an art museum or an ethnographic documentation, to cut this discussion short. English anthropologists in recent times accused the so-called anthropology of art of lacking any distinctive subject matter. Jeremy Coote and Anthony Shelton therefore voted for a break with aesthetics in order to overcome “an exaggerated respect for art”³. I do not want to interfere with this debate as it does not concern my topic. Nor do I feel competent to comment on the latest discussions in Visual Culture or Cultural Studies, as my battlefield has been in Europe where other disciplines play a role.

In Germany, several text-oriented disciplines like Literary Criticism have recently discovered visual media such as film, photography or the Internet as their new domain. They are backed by a new type of media studies which define culture in terms of technologies of communication and usually reapply old theories of semiology. The battle cry is “Bildwissenschaft”, a vision of a new kind of iconology as it was heralded by Tom Mitchell but has not gained safe grounds. It is less a concern of method than a claim for competence with regard to iconic media not based on texts. It has to be said however that visual production and experience in general often tends to be confused with the image in particular, but in my view the image has to be identified as a symbolic entity (therefore also an item of selection and memory) and to be distinguished from the permanent flux in our visual environments. The subtitle of my book reads: “Proposals for a Bildwissenschaft”, since I regard the latter as an interdisciplinary project of the future

(and therefore of no special concern for art history which continues to have its own territories). The German debate however concerns the so-called problem whether art history, without losing its inherited profile, should contribute to this transdisciplinary debate or whether it should stay away and thus leave that ground to others. I cannot share this false alternative, since even famous art historians like Ernst H. Gombrich have easily lived with two options, in his case with classical Art History and with his own version of a Psychology of Perception. Aby Warburg would have developed a most important anthropology with regard to images (both images in Western culture and beyond), if he had not been cut short by his health and if he would not have been drastically reduced to an iconology in terms of Erwin Panofsky and Edgar Wind, who defused the dangerous part of his early vision and turned his own ideas back to a mere method of practicing Art History.

In Germany, the Berlin group of Historische Anthropologie, located at the Freie Universität, has strongly insisted on the philosophical tradition of Anthropology as an analytical tool to discuss one's own culture. Christoph Wulf and Gunter Gebauer have identified protagonists such as Norbert Elias, Helmuth Plessner or Victor Turner, whose anthropology of performance has served as a frequent inspiration. Wulf and his colleagues investigate subjects such as the ritual in every day life or mimesis, as a transcultural attitude, as well as the body in a rich gamut of aspects. Their broader aim is a reorientation of the humanities whose accumulated knowledge is going to be tested in the mirror of our present thinking and world experience⁴. In France, a similar group works at the Maison de l'Homme (Ecole des Hautes Etudes) where Le Goff and Jean-Claude Schmitt as well as Marc Augé have acted as the principal founders, Le Goff and Schmitt rooted in Medieval History and Augé rooted in Ethnology⁵. Marc Augé's present position reveals best from his book "An anthropology for contemporary worlds". His Social Anthropology is centered on what he calls "supermodernity" rather than postmodernism. His themes closely border on the status of images both in history and in the present world, as they concern the present redefinition of *space*, the future of *imagination* or the new power of *fiction*, to mention some of his favoured topics. In his book "La guerre des rêves", Augé explicitly refers to Serge Gruzinski's work "La guerre des images" where the author traces the history of images in Mexico well across and beyond the time limits of colonialization.⁶ The latest issue of the "Revue de l'Homme", edited by Carlo Severi,

assembles a number of contributors from the disciplines of Ethnology, Social History, and Art History under the heading “Image et Athropologie”⁷.

At the College de France, Jean-Pierre Vernant initiated a new activity on the “chaire d’étude comparée des religions antiques” in the seventies. He concentrated his “anthropologie historique de l’image” on ancient Greece where, in his own words, “le statut de l’image, de l’imagination et de l’imaginaire” were his main concerns.⁸ For this purpose, he revealed the close links existing between the history of visual artifacts and, on the other hand, the evolution of Greek thought which discussed images in respect of *symbol*, *resemblance*, *imitation* and *appearance*. Greece is a unique case, as its early images are mirrored in contemporary thought whose language still looms in our terminology and epistemology.

In particular, Vernant devoted much energy to the meaning of *eidolon* and *kolossos* in preclassical thinking. *Eidolon* was understood as the image of a dream, the apparition of a god or the phantom of dead ancestors. It largely covers the meaning of mental and mnemonic images in symbolic thinking, images projected onto the exterior world. Against their fleeting nature *kolossos* represents the artifact of stone or metal which today we would call medium in which images materialized, though *kolossos* could be also aniconic in the modern sense of the word.⁹ Both *eidolon* and *kolossos* refer back to a human being, as a third parameter in this configuration: a person living in a body who experienced the *eidolon* and fabricated the *kolossos*, the one as a product of imagination and the other as the result of creating artifacts. My aim is to generalize Vernant’s configuration and to propose a triangular interrelation in which *image*, *body* and *medium* would be the three poles¹⁰.

One aspect however deserves special attention. It is the question of what *is* or what *makes* an image. Vernant speaks of a rupture in Greek thinking which was necessary to bring about the concept of the image in our sense. The rupture occurred around 500 BC when the Greek language for the first time used the term *eikon*, incidentally at the same time when also the term *mimesis* makes its first appearance. *Eikon* immediately devaluated the *eidolon* which now adopted a negative significance in the sense of copy and dead imitation, while *eikon* attracted the need for ontological definitions. Vernant allows for the definition of the *image* only after this rupture, while he reserves the terms *double* or

substitute for artifacts preceding that break. In his view, it needed the philosophical distinction between *appearance* and *being* before images became possible and thinkable.

I however wonder whether images were not there from the very beginning, even when they did not match Platonic definitions. It was the *making* of images which established their place in human thinking. It is another matter that, as Vernant rightly emphasizes, it needed a critical moment in Greek culture when images for the first time were *discussed*, because they were *questioned*. The Greek theatre also contributed to this newly emerging critical debate. The audience in the Attic theatre laughed when statues began running over the stage or suddenly started speaking. One knew that images were not able to behave like living people and thus experienced a movement of enlightenment whose spokesman was to become the great mediologist of the name Platon who included images in his violent critique of script, as opposed to living language.¹¹

I myself made my entry in the anthropological discourse with the topic of “Image and Death” when, in 1995, I attended a colloquium dedicated to the meaning of death in the different religions and cultures of the world.¹² Soon, it became clear that I had hit a crucial example for understanding the making of images. Body and medium are both involved in the meaning of funeral images, as it is the *missing body* of the dead in whose place images were installed (fig. 2). But these images in turn were in need of an artificial body in order to occupy the vacant place of the deceased. That artificial body may be called *medium* (and not just material) in the sense that images needed embodiment in order to acquire any kind of visibility. In this respect, a *lost body* is exchanged against the *virtual body* of the image. Here we grasp the roots of that very contradiction which will characterize images forever: images, as we all agree, make an *absence* visible by transforming it into a new kind of presence. The *iconic presence* of the dead nevertheless admits and even intentionally stages the finality of that *absence* which is *death*. The mediality of images thus is rooted in a body analogy, incidentally also in the sense that our bodies function as media themselves, as living media against any fabricated media. Images *happen* between *us* who look at them, and their *media* with which they respond to our gaze. They rely on two symbolic acts which both involve our living body: the act of *fabrication* and the act of *perception*, the one being the purpose of the other.

Let me at this point briefly introduce the findings from the so-called Pre-pottery Neolithic culture B (to use Kathleen Kenyon's terminology) in the Near East, which date around 7.000 B.C. and have received much attention in recent times.¹³ But the attention has been concentrated on just one out of three types of images which, in this first known case of human settlements, represent the dead ancestors (fig. 3). These are the famous *skulls* which have been transformed into living heads or life images by a new skin of clay, by touches of live colour and by eyes via inserted shells, before they were mounted on small supporting figures. Here the lost body in the pars-pro-toto of the skull has been restored in the guise of an image. The skull acts as an image and at the same time as an authentic medium supporting an image of its lost life. We even may go one step further and deduce from this act (the exchange of a new image against the old image covering the living skull) the hypothesis that the face by those people was believed to be a living image over the bones. But there exist two other types of images which deserve equal attention. The one is a kind of *effigy* or puppet representing the body as a whole and constructed like a natural body by a strange simile of entrails envelopped in a kind of skin, a type used probably for ephemeral functions in the ritual of entombment (fig. 4). The other and last type of image which alone among the three was to have a lasting success, is a *mask* covering either the face of the dead or the face of living actors who performed the dead (fig. 5).

The mask is the most brilliant invention which ever occurred in the making of images and represents a telling commentary on their meaning. It beautifully epitomizes the simultaneity as well as opposition between absence and presence which so much has characterized the majority of images in human use. The mask exposes a new and permanent, because not perishable face by hiding another face whose absence is needed to create this new presence. A mask with empty eye sockets and with an open mouth even was ready to serve as a speaking image. Helmuth Plessner discussed the anthropological implications of the mask in his famous essay "On the Anthropology of the Actor".¹⁴ We may go one step further and venture the view that every image, in a way, could be classified as a mask, wether transforming a body into an image or existing as a separate entity beside the body. Facial decoration and tattooing could turn the actual human face into a mask. Metamorphosis as the birth of the image here is highly relevant. The ancient meaning of a mask as *persona* received much attention in humanist thinking. Thus, in a recent paper, I discussed the lid of a lost Renaissance portrait where a mask,

paradoxically invested with life colours, is meant to denounce also the portrait which it once covered as a mask. The accompanying epigram reads: *Sui cuique persona* or, “For everybody his or her *persona*” which consciously plays with the double meaning of the term as either mask or person.¹⁵ In the sense that it is a most peculiar mask of a face, also the portrait belongs to the history of that relation which I call image and death (fig. 6).

Turning to modern times, I would like to remind you of Julius von Schlosser’s view, already published in 1911, that photography in a way inherited those functions of wax figures which by then had become obsolete. At that time, the wax figure cabinet had debased the old symbolic effigy, as it was used for royal funerals or votive statues in churches. The cabinet *continued* an old medium in the *discontinuity* of its meaning which tells us something about the complexities inherent in any mediality.¹⁶ Hiroshi Sugimoto increases this complexity in his photographs of wax figures. This interplay of two media intentionally subverts and destabilizes photography’s indexicality (fig. 7). The bodies which we expect to see in such a picture, yield to their lifeless doppelgänger who nevertheless seem to look very much alive.¹⁷ We are either trapped by this confusion or invited to enjoy the ambiguous cross-reference. Ambiguity paradoxically helps to emphasize one medium on the evidence of another via a counter-reference. Sugimoto involuntarily also stresses a point made by Roland Barthes. In a photograph, Barthes wrote, “I have become all-image, i.e. death in person”, and he added that this “micro-expérience de la mort” was preceded by the long obsession with the double.¹⁸

Photography became an imprint of a new type, no longer the moulding or trace of a body's surface as volume, but the imprint of a body's flat appearance in light and subsequently on paper. This type of imprint fixed a moment into permanence and thus in a way reenacted the custom of tracing a cast shadow on a wall which caused Henry Fox-Talbot for quite a while to consider the term “skiagraphy” before he decided to call his invention “photography”.¹⁹ In his book “Secure the Shadow”, Jay Ruby published an American 19th century photography where a family poses with a photograph of their dead husband and father. Thus the photographer with naïve accuracy repeated an old ritual which at any time had served the social reintegration of the dead by their images. The picture seems to contain not just another picture but stages an image of memory like a relic from a lost time.²⁰

I cannot sufficiently discuss our contemporary experiences of image and death. To single out just one case, we expect the death of a public personality to be a target for the news. The picture of the deceased however is not meant to stay in our memory thereafter, but is meant to introduce the dead in their new (only picture based) status. The picture occupies the place which dead individuals would have continued to occupy in the mass media, if they had been still alive. Thus, we have to distinguish two radically opposing purposes. Whereas such a picture of the living person would be an average snap-shot, the same picture, at the moment of death, changes its meaning altogether. It now represents the absence of someone, or its empty place, in the same environment of which this person up till now was an integral part. Even in such residual practices, we experience the survival of that “symbolic exchange” to which Jean Baudrillard dedicated a famous book.²¹

It is however not the meaning of death but the quest for the image which justifies the topic in my case. A somewhat similar perspective, at least in part, characterizes Régis Debray’s book “Vie et mort de l’image” which provides me with the opportunity to introduce yet another name.²² Debray is best known for his program called “mediologie” to which we shall return. But in this book he concentrates on the image. In the preface, he calls the image a domesticated “terreur”, since its origin “is strongly linked to death”. He rightly insists on the importance of mediological evolution and therefore can say “that any fabricated image is dated by its fabrication as well is by its following reception”. But he also allows for an equal discussion of all those images which only live in our thinking and in our imagination. He therefore cites Gaston Bachelard with the formula that “death had first been an image, and it will ever remain an image”, since we do not know what death really is.²³ We could speak in similar terms about space or time.

In order to cope with this other, intangible type of a mental image, Debray introduces the gaze in its place, for it is in his view the gaze which transmits images of mental nature. While David Freedberg in his book “The Power of Images” singled out the “response” to images, as the subtitle says, Debray insists on the gaze as the force which turns a picture into an image.²⁴ “Practicing the gaze does not merely amount to reception but serves the purpose of ordering (*ordonner*) the visible. The image draws its meaning from the gaze, much as the text lives from reading.” The gaze, for him, is not just a social technique close to violence such as the one between the sexes, but implies the living body as a

whole. The French term “regard”, with the implication of “prendre garde”, has other connotations than the terms “gaze”, “look” and “glance” to use distinctions in the English language which have been discussed in this respect by Norman Bryson²⁵. The English words “regard” and “regardful” come closer to what is meant here, and this also applies to the words “watch” or “watch out” which appear in the linguistic vicinity of the French term “regard”. We are condemned to live in the labyrinth of our own languages which so often restrict and even close off parts of the semantic spectrum of what we want to describe and thus do not only narrow our terminology but also our thinking. The same kind of apory applies to the image experience at the other end. We usually do not speak of transmitting images, though this would be the exact circumscription of what I am talking here. It is not by chance that Debray dedicated another, very political book to the topic of transmission (Transmettre) whose meaning he sets against the banal sense of communication²⁶. We encounter images as a rule in a situation of performance, but their performative quality is played down by current terminologies of the discourse. Images, we may remember, are not just there, but arrive with a predetermined mise-en-scène which also includes a predetermined site for their perception which they guide by way of performance.

In anthropological terms, I would argue against any rigid dualism which so often separates internal and external representation, to use a terminology current in neurobiological research, and thus assigns them to two entirely distinct areas. Our brain certainly is the site of internal representation even in that process which we simplify in calling it just perception. Such *endogene* images however react also to *exogene* images which tend to take the ruling part in this cooperation. Images neither exist only on the wall (or in the TV) nor only in our heads. They cannot be extricated from a continuous exercise of interaction which has left so many traces in the history of artefacts. This old and new interaction even continues in the era of digital images (*images discrètes*), as Bernard Stiegler has rightly pointed out. ”There have never existed physical images (*images objet*) without the participation of mental images, since an image by definition is one that is seen (is only one when seen). Reciprocally also mental images rely on objective images in the sense that they are the *retour* or the *rémanence* of the latter. The question of the image always concerns that of the trace and of the inscription”²⁷. With other words, mental images are inscribed in external ones and viceversa. In this respect, Augé speaks of the “dreams” which the

individual has, against the “icons” of the public realm which live on in the dreams²⁸. Their give and take make the collective *imaginaire* a highly contested area that also attracts the desire of political control

The interaction between our bodies and external images however includes a third parameter which I call *medium* in the sense of vector, agent, *dispositif*, as the French say, or support, host and tool of images. This may meet with some resistance, as we are familiar with media only in the sense of the mass media of today. I therefore would like to introduce two premises which may help to clarify my argument. First it may be said that I do not speak of images *as* media, as we usually do, but instead like to argue that images in turn *use* media of their own in order to transmit their messages to us and to become visible for us to start with. Images even migrate between different media or combine the distinctive features of several media. And there is a second premise, namely the assumption that even our body operates as a living medium of its own. It is with this born capacity (that of the representing body) that we are in a position to make use of fabricated media and easily distinguish them from the inherent images in the sense that we take such media neither for simple objects nor for real bodies. Already Platon was aware of the difference between bodies as natural media against writing and picturing as artificial media when he argued against the latter as dead memories while he defended living or bodily memory.

Also Debray’s group insists on the mediological importance both past and present, though with an emphasis different from my own. The respective journal and books carry the label “Le champ mediologique”. Debray’s project is turned against the monopoly of French semiology and therefore is geared toward other aspects of culture such as their material, symbolic and historical face. In his book “Dieu, un itinéraire”, Debray discusses the mediological impact of scripture on the evolution of monotheism while Monique Sicard traces the “fabrique du regard” in imaging science and in the technologies of vision²⁹. I sympathize with this approach, though my aims are more centered on the image which I discuss both in its mediological evolution and in its mental disposition

Mediological evolution, to single out just one all too familiar case, means to identify the European panel picture as a most specific and culture-based invention from the time of early perspectivism, since it did not exist in any other culture. *Mental disposition*, on the

other hand, means the same medium's appropriation for the purpose of representation, as is apparent from the portrait at once. The framed viewing field which was to be inherited by the TV screen and beyond, first relied on a most specific window architecture which developed in the European Middle Ages, and second on a corresponding European mentality eager to control the world via a tele-view from within, meaning from a position apart (a dualism separating inside and outside, subject and world).

The distinction between image and medium depends on our changing attention either for the one or the other, i.e. relies on choice rather than on a precondition inherent in a given artefact. This may be demonstrated by two examples chosen at random. They look similar, as in each case a spectator scrutinizes a picture with the magnifying glass, but their intention is different. There is the art historian B. Berenson who controls Durer's brushwork on a picture without paying any attention to the portrait image on the respective canvas (fig. 8). The picture, in this case, shrinks to the specimen of Durer's style, i.e. to a historical medium on its own terms. Thus, Berenson is splitting the image from the medium in his professional attention. And there is the reporter in Antonioni's movie "Blow up" who inspects a photographic print of his own for the sole purpose of detecting an overlooked trace of a crime committed on the site, much as Berenson searches for a trace of Durer's art (fig. 9). We do however usually the opposite and tend to ignore the medium while looking for an image, as if images could exist by themselves. Image and medium, so inseparable in the result, again separate in our look. Contemporary artists such as Cindy Sherman use this ambivalence for creating confusing cross-references between different media (media actually used and those only cited) up to the point that we can no longer safely allocate image and medium. I only mention her pseudo film stills which simulate films but are mere photographs or think of her masks when she herself performs in her photographs much as the model in old paintings³⁰

Two much debated topics in the history of images invite us to look at the distinction of image and medium from again another side. *Iconoclasm*, as violence against images, only achieved to destroy their medium-support, i.e. their tangible and visible bodies. The respective practice intended to deprive images of their medial presence and thus to deprive them of their public presence. The iconoclast acts of symbolic *destruction* only

mirror the equally solemn acts of *installation* which such images have experienced in the public space. These acts serve the intention to also annihilate the mental images which were inspired by them. Their ambition drives the iconoclasts to eradicate the icons of the enemy in the imagination of a given society. We have recently seen this once again in the destruction of the Saddam statues at Bagdad which was performed like a symbolic victory over the tyrant. The purification of the collective imaginary however could never control what it ultimately intended, the oblivion or the contempt of the destroyed images in the minds of the people.

The distinction of image and medium equally applies to the undisputed definition of what an image is: the *presence of an absence*. Its presence certainly is one in our gaze, a gaze of recognition which helps us to animate images much like living beings. But the factual presence and visibility of images relies on their transmission by a given medium in which they appear or are performed whether they turn up on a monitor or are embodied in an old statue. In their own name, images successfully testify to the absence of what they make present. In the name of their media, they already *own* that very presence which they need to act. Thus, the riddle of images to be or to mean the presence of an absence, at least in part results from our capacity to distinguish image and medium. We are willing to credit images with the reference to something absent: we actually can *see* that absence which resurfaces in the paradoxical visibility which may be called medium. You may object that this applies to the signifier and the signified in semiology as well, but it must be said that semiology in turn derived that same relation from the old image discourse. The difference may be clarified by contrasting image and language: the visible word does not belong to the same category as the visible absence, since images have no safe code which links them with their model. Rather, the body analogy here comes into play again. The relation between absence, understood as invisibility, and presence, understood as visibility, is in the last instance rooted in our body experience. The same applies to our bodily memory which generates images for the purpose of representing absent events or people remembered from another time. We tend to *imagine* as present what in fact has long become absent and apply the same capacity to external images we fabricate. The mediality is the missing link between images and our bodies.

To conclude my all too brief survey of a topic which I provisionally have called "Bildanthropologie", I would like to consult a work of contemporary art in order to find out whether my argument also helps to investigate a concrete case or whether it does not. For this purpose, I choose a work by Nam June Paik, the first work recreated as a short circuit installation by that Korean born artist and the first to appear in his long series of TV-Buddhas, as it dates from 1974 (fig. 10).³¹ This work has been the subject of several texts which I have published over the last ten years, the last being the essay "Beyond iconoclasm" for the Karlsruhe exhibition "Iconoclasm" from 2002. The short circuit, produced by a video camera projecting ever the same image of Buddha twenty-five times a second on the TV screen, still reflects the early fascination with life images in the TV news which J. C. Bringuier called the "mystique du direct". The usual time lapse from which images ever have lived, has (or seems to have) broken down in this case. We are instead reminded of a mirror situation. The mirror offered an old experience of images, where any reflection happens in the present tense. Even the mirror image, though, is complicated enough. The absolute symmetry between the looking body and the surface of glass is a fiction. The mirror as such is empty and therefore needs a body for generating an image, but the image in turn needs us who identify it as our "other", a capacity we acquire in the famous mirror stage.

But the mirror analogy in Paik's work in turn relies on fiction. The Buddha (who incidentally is a monk) does not look, and the mirror is operated by remote control. Paik creates a false tautology between the speed of the new medium ("TV") and the sculptural immobility of the old medium ("Buddha"), both of Japanese origin but divided by an abyss of time. As we see (or seem to see) twice the same image (the one old and three-dimensional, the other new and electronic), we are again introduced into the non-identity of image and medium. The image we see twice, is neither in front of nor inside the TV-screen (where, by the way, it arrives from an external source). The image is of a paradoxical ambiguity if we are willing to forget the respective technical causality for a moment: it transgresses the boundaries between two media opposed by a radical difference. And there is finally a body whose image we see twice, in the primary image of the statue and in the secondary image on the screen: a body represented (in the statue) and representing (reflecting).

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- ¹ Hans Belting, *Bild-Anthropologie. Entwürfe für eine Bildwissenschaft* (München: Fink Verlag, 2001), (to appear in French, Gallimard 2004)
- ² Robert Frank, *The lines of my hand* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1989) (no page numbers)
- ³ Jeremy Coote and Anthony Shelton, ed., *Anthropology, Art and Aesthetics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 1-11.
- ⁴ Gunter Gebauer, "Überlegungen zur Anthropologie", in: Gunther Gebauer, *Anthropologie* (Leipzig 1998), 7-21; Christoph Wulf - Dietmar Kamper, *Logik und Leidenschaft. Erträge historischer Anthropologie* (Berlin: Reimer, 2002), 1-8
- ⁵ Jean-Claude Schmitt, *Le corps, les rites, les rêves, le temps. Essais d'anthropologie médiévale* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 2001); Marc Augé, *An Anthropology for contemporary worlds* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1999)
- ⁶ Marc Augé, *La guerre des Rêves. Exercices d'ethno-fiction* (Paris: Editions Du Seuil, 1997); Serge Gruzinski, *La guerre des images* (Paris: Fayard, 1990)
- ⁷ Carlo Severi, "Pour une anthropologie des images", in: L'Homme. Revue française d'anthropologie no. 165, 2003, 7-9
- ⁸ Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs* (Paris: Gallimard, 1990³) 349ff.; Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Figures, idoles, masques* (Paris: Julliard, 1990), 13
- ⁹ Vernant, *Figures, Idoles*, 25-30 and 34-41
- ¹⁰ Belting, *Bild-Anthropologie*, 7-9 and 11-18. Cf. Hans Belting et al., *Quel Corps? Eine Frage der Repräsentation* (München: Fink Verlag, 2002), IX-X (discussing the research program of the Karlsruhe group)
- ¹¹ Belting, *Bild-Anthropologie*, 173
- ¹² Hans Belting, "Aus dem Schatten des Todes. Bild und Körper in den Anfängen", in: Constantin von Barloewen, ed., *Der Tod in den Weltkulturen und Weltreligionen* (München: Diederichs 1996), 92-136. Cf. the revised and expanded version in: Belting, *Bild-Anthropologie*, 143-188
- ¹³ Belting, *Bild-Anthropologie*, 150-154. Cf. Kathleen M. Kenyon, *Excavations at Jericho*, vol. III (London, 1981), pl. 51-60
- ¹⁴ Helmuth Plessner, "Zur Anthropologie des Schauspielers", in: Gebauer, *Anthropologie*, 185-202
- ¹⁵ Hans Belting, "Repräsentation und Anti-Repräsentation. Grab und Porträt in der frühen Neuzeit", in: Belting, *Quel Corps?*, 41-43
- ¹⁶ Julius von Schlosser, *Tote Blicke. Geschichte der Porträtbilderei in Wachs* (1911), ed., Theod. Medicus (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993), 119-130
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